UNEP Points Finger at Criminals in the Niger Region

A number of newspapers report this morning that a UNEP report examining oil spills in the Niger region of Nigeria is set to argue that the main proportion of spills causing widespread environmental damage and human suffering in the region is caused by criminal activity. The report (to be published later this year) points out that 90% of the oil spills are a result of criminal gangs stealing oil.  These claims are in themselves interesting as multinational corporations, in particular Shell, have often come in for heavy criticism as a result of their activities in the Niger Delta (often rightly so). Critics of the report point out, according to the news reports, that it is based on government figures which are unreliable and that the report is funded by Shell.  While the latter claim seems a kneejerk reaction, the former comes across as more plausible insofar as the Nigerian government has often shown a worrying disinterest when it comes to securing that extraction activities are carried out diligently. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the problem of oil spills is only one of many problems in the region. Other issues include the gas flaring at wells which continues despite agreements between the government and oil companies.

News reports can be found here and here.

Max Planck Encyclopedia – August Upload

Last week, OUP uploaded 40 new articles to the Encyclopedia. Two of the articles in particular exemplify the way the Encyclopedia’s content addresses the international law aspects of topical issues in international affairs. The Lockerbie Cases article explains the ICJ proceedings and the criminal trial which saw the conviction of Abdelbaset Ali Al Megrhai whose controversial release in 2009 has led to diplomatic tensions between the UK and USA. The international law background to Kosovo’s declaration of independence which was the subject of an ICJ Advisory Opinion in July 2010 can be found in the article on Territorial Integrity and Political Independence.

For more information, visit www.mpepil.com.

Thanks to Nik Speller for drawing my attention to this.

New ICRC Database on Customary IHL – Happy Birthday, Geneva Conventions!

To mark the 61st anniversary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 – a truly momentous event – the ICRC has released a new database on customary IHL. The database is a particularly exciting new source of information which offers new useful materials and resources for eager international law practitioners and scholars.

The ICRC’s press release notes that this database is, in essence, the online version of the Study on customary international humanitarian law, conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and published by Cambridge University Press in 2005.

The new database features 50 per cent more content than the original study – a printed version would run to more than 8,000 pages. It also gives the opportunity to investigate underlying practice by means of three search parameters: subject matter, type of practice and country.

It further explains that it is divided in two parts :

  • Part 1. Rules offers a comprehensive analysis of the customary rules of international humanitarian law identified by the Study and considered to be applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the Study does not purport to offer an exhaustive assessment of all customary rules in this field.
  • Part 2. Practice contains the underlying practice. For each aspect of international humanitarian law covered, it provides a summary of relevant state practice including military manuals, legislation, case-law and official statements, as well as practice of international organizations, conferences and judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. This part of the database will be updated on a regular basis by the ICRC, in cooperation with the British Red Cross. The materials of this update are gathered by a network of ICRC delegations and of National Red Cross and National Red Crescent Societies around the world and incorporated by a research team based at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge. To date Part 2. Practice has been updated with practice from the United Nations and international and mixed judicial and quasi-judicial bodies up until the end of 2007. Subsequent updates will include material from national sources of practice. The text of updated practice is marked in green.

Interestingly, and also usefully, the Sources that were used in the Study are listed separately. These sources are organized in 12 categories of information, such as military manuals, national legislation and national case-law.

The database can be accessed from here. Enjoy!

Book review – Carolina León Bastos: La interpretación de los derechos fundamentales según los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos

Carolina León Bastos: La interpretación de los derechos fundamentales según los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos. Un estudio de la jurisprudencia en España y Costa Rica (English translation of the title: The Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in Accordance with International Human Rights Treaties. A Study of the Spanish and Costa Rican Jurisprudence). Madrid. Reus. 328 p. ISBN: 9788429016215 (in Spanish)

The question of how international law is incorporated into and applied in domestic legal orders is not only a question of high practical relevance; it is also, at least in many regards, still an under-researched subject. The book by Carolina León Bastos contributes to closing this gap by providing an in-depth analysis of how international human rights treaties have influenced the interpretation of domestic fundamental rights provisions in the Spanish and Costa Rican legal order.

The comparison of these two countries is particularly interesting because both the Spanish and the Costa Rican Constitution contain specific provisions which open the domestic legal order to international law in the area of human rights. While the Spanish Constitution stipulates that constitutional fundamental rights provisions “shall be construed in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain” (Article 10(2)), the Costa Rican Constitution provides for the right to file constitutional complaints (recursos de amparo) with the Supreme Court of Justice regarding any right of “fundamental nature established in international instruments on human rights, enforceable in the Republic” (Article 48). The analysis proposed by this book allows thus for insights as to how such “gateway clauses” are interpreted and applied in practice and what their impact may be on the respective overall constitutional framework.

The book starts by setting out a comprehensive theoretical framework on the rules and principles of legal interpretation with an emphasis on the specificities of the interpretations of constitutions and human rights provisions. Subsequently, the author examines the two constitutional frameworks, in particular the two aforesaid “gateway clauses”. The key part of the book is, however, the in-depth analysis of the judicial practice, which is based on an exhaustive review of the Spanish and Costa Rican jurisprudence.

Overall, the author finds that international human rights treaties exert an increasing influence on the interpretation of the fundamental rights provisions of the two legal systems examined. The author identifies an increasing tendency to take into account international treaties and the related international jurisprudence at the domestic level, although Spanish courts seem, in general, more receptive to international legal norms than Costa Rican courts. Interestingly, Spanish courts have in some respects gone beyond what is required by Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution. Among other things, courts have interpreted this Article widely so as to comprise also certain ILO Conventions and have, in some cases, taken into account even those treaties that have not been ratified by Spain. As regards the Costa Rican Constitution, it appears that the vague wording of its Article 48 (“rights (…) of fundamental nature established in international instruments on human rights”) as well as the scope of the term “instrument on human rights” itself have led to some legal uncertainty and other legal problems. In this respect, the author proposes alternative language that would solve the problems arising in this context.

Overall, Carolina León Bastos’ work succeeds in unraveling not only the details of the case law integrating international treaty law into the domestic legal orders but also the legal dynamics and developments leading to the current state of the art. This book, which is based on her doctoral thesis presented at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in 2006, will be of high value to constitutional lawyers, human rights lawyers, legal theorists and the international law community more widely.

Will the Supreme Court start citing the ICJ?

Yes, if we are to believe David Andrews, former legal advisor to the US state department and member of the US national group at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. If you want to see more on this, check out this weeks Clip of the Week, which is taken from an ASIL reception honoring Joan E. Donoghue, the US nominee to the International Court of Justice.

Diamonds, Celebrities and the Charles Taylor trial

The courtroom used by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in The Hague (Leidschendam) has rarely, if ever, been so busy with journalists from all over the world following the Charles Taylor trial. The eagerly awaited testimonies of Naomi Campbell and Mia Farrow have been widely broadcast by the international media. Unfortunately however, with these celebrities stepping into the witness box, it seems that the trial is sliding into a soap opera, completely losing sight of the fact that the SCSL was set up for the victims, their families, towns, and districts, as the former SCSL prosecutor David Crane put it. The contradictory statements made before the court by Naomi Campbell and Mia Farrow about the issue whether Mrs. Campbell received diamonds from Mr. Taylor or not, seem to not have brought the case any further, save for temporarily diverging attention from the bigger issues involved therein.

One is left with the impression of a too obvious an attempt by Mrs. Campbell to avoid her name being associated with blood diamonds. While memory is certain to fade 13 years after  the event, it is difficult to believe that after having been awoken in the middle of the night by strangers, one accepts a pouch without asking from whom it was, puts it next to  the bed and goes to sleep!

Worrisome here is the lack of diligence of the media to continuously and responsibly report on international criminal justice and its less well-known institutions, such as the SCSL. Where were they when Charles Taylor himself was being cross-examined?! While the media did not devote much attention to the work of the SCSL earlier on, out of a sudden is all over it – its interest in the proceedings revolving around celebrities! Do we really care about the victims? Or are we more interested in the number of the viewers? I guess what we all learned now is that if international criminal justice proceedings want to secure media attention, involvement of celebrities might help!!!!

New FIDH Report and the Prospects of International Justice

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), a major umbrella NGO for over 160 different organisations, recently (July 2010) launched “Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses: A Guide for Victims and NGOs on Recourse Mechanisms“. The guide is comprised of five sections. Each examines a different type of instrument, including intergovernmental mechanisms, legal options, mediation mechanisms such as the OECD national contact points, complaints mechanisms stemming from financial support received by companies and mechanisms that can be explored according to voluntary commitments taken by companies.

The report’s section II on Judicial Mechanisms considers both the civil and the criminal avenues for extraterritorial liability of corporations for human rights abuses. The issue of criminal liability is in practice a less explored avenue which should in fact become the focus of the work of many organisations who have reported and monitored the complicity of corporations in violations of international humanitarian law committed by states. It is also interesting to consider Yasmine Gado’s paper for this purpose, see here.

The research done on the criminal liability of companies attests to the fact that the legal means by which a victim can hold a company accountable for its criminal liability are immensely limited compared to those available for civil liability claims. This is also why the two, i.e. the civil and the criminal, have produced two different types of struggle, the former for the application and usability of the mechanisms and their effectiveness, and the latter for the creation of appropriate avenues that recognise the ability of companies to violate IHL and bring about the result of their criminal liability in international courts and tribunals. The underlying logic of international justice has produced this very conclusion with regards to the reach of companies’ operations on a number of previous occasions. The FIDH report refers to one of these conclusions as follows,

“In South Africa, following hearings which began in November 1997 on the involvement of economic actors in the system of apartheid,234 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) ruled unequivocally that companies had provided material support to the institutionalised crime. The TRC held that the companies played a central role in supporting the economy which kept the South African State running under apartheid and that companies derived substantial profit from the system of racial privileges. The TRC went so far as to say that some companies, particularly in the mining sector, contributed to the development and implementation of the apartheid system.235 A full ten years earlier, the United Nations General Assembly had already condemned apartheid’s widespread and systematic use of racial discrimination as a crime against humanity. The UN Convention of 1973 on the elimination and Repression of the Crime of Apartheid established that “organisations, institutions and individuals committing crimes of apartheid are criminal.”” (p. 247)

De facto, multinational corporations have taken up an eminent role in the world of non-state actors in international law. It is strongly arguable that they have become part and parcel not only of the law-breaking but also of the law-making forces on the international arena. As a non-state actor, corporations have even been granted greater recognition than most non-state, even though state like, armed opposition groups, such as Hezbollah or Hamas. The latter may have a longer history and a government structure more akin to that of a statal entity, but would nevertheless be denied the minimal “recognition” and the needed “legitimacy” in the political sense to be afforded international rights and be held as fully obligated to comply with all international laws, just like states are.

The FIDH notes that this guide seeks to provide a practical tool for victims and their representatives to seek justice and obtain reparation for human rights abuses involving multinational corporations. It should be noted that in the world of international, or should we say transnational, human rights litigation it is the multinational corporations who are often the ‘best’ targets for victims to obtain reparation. In other words, courts are more readily scrutinising the behaviour of delinquent companies (i.e. under the doctrine of civil universal jurisdiction) compared to that of delinquent states (i.e. under the doctrine of criminal universal jurisdiction). It is also apparently much easier for victims to haunt down violators of international law on civil grounds than it is on criminal ones; presumably this is based not only on the lower evidential thresholds of civil suits but also their less abrasive political ramifications. It is widely agreed that this, often artificial, non-application of international humanitarian and human rights law to companies as non-state actors on the international plain, as well as the absence of precedent on the incrimination of companies’ officials on grounds of individual responsibility, are grave deficiencies that stand in abrupt contradiction with the foundational spirit and intended prospects of international justice (see also our previous coverage of this issue, here).

The Council of Europe’s work on secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees in Europe

The Committee on legal affairs and human rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (COE) has published a briefing note on the Council of Europe’s investigation into illegal transfers and secret detentions in Europe: a chronology. It should be reminded that the COE Parliamentary Assembly has so far adopted two resolutions and recommendations on this matter.  More specifically, it has adopted two resoultions: Resolution 1507 (2006) on alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states; and Resolution 1562 (2007) on secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report. The COE Parliamentary Assembly has also adopted Recommendation 1754 (2006) on alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states, and Recommendation 1801 (2007) on Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report. The Committee on legal affairs and human rights is currently preparing a follow-up report to the “Marty reports” on secret detentions: “Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of human rights violations”.

Book Review: Solon Solomon, The Justiciability of International Disputes – The Advisory Opinion of Israel’s Security Fence as a Case Study

Solon Solomon, The Justiciability of International Disputes – The Advisory Opinion of Israel’s Security Fence as a Case Study (Jerusalem: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009) ISBN: 978-90-5850-437-1

By Dr. Fozia Nazir Lone

Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong, fnlone@cityu.edu.hk

Solon Solomon, in this book presents a comprehensive legal description on the justiciability of international disputes. This book was the author’s LLM thesis that he successfully wrote at the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University. His book specifically provides a thorough legal analysis on the International Court of Justice’s (hereinafter ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 ICJ Rep. 136 (July 9, 2004) (hereinafter Advisory Opinion) from the Israeli perspective. Solomon tries to balance the legal arguments by reviewing it both from the security standpoint as well as the justiciability dimension. The author accepts that the present approach to settlement of disputes by the ICJ is to perceive that each case has both legal and political aspect and the Court simply focus on the legal issue/s. Hence presence of political aspect to a dispute does not render an issue non-justiciable (Page180). The author premises his thesis on the fact that there are certain issues that are inherently non-justiciable as justiciability stricto sensu and the Advisory Opinion is examined from this standpoint.

The author, an international practitioner who served in the Knesset Legal Department and was in charge of constitutional and international law issues, argues that it is the clash of two significant international law issues i.e. the legality of settlements and the settler’s right to life that renders it non-justiciable as the Court is unable to uphold one principle over the other without being accused of adopting a biased attitude. The author rightly mentions that the Court’s ruling on the illegality of settlements was not feasible due to a lack of crucial topographical evidence. As such the author includes the Israeli Supreme Court cases on the construction of security fence and provides a reader an opportunity to compare two points of views. This book is divided into three long chapters that deal with the justiciability doctrine its nature and role in the adjudication of issues (Chapter I), the justiciability doctrine and the Advisory Opinion on Israel’s security fence (Chapter II) and the Israeli Supreme Court and the Security Fence (Chapter. III). The book also has a short introduction and an epilogue that is not included as a chapter.

Chapter I systematically provides a theoretical review of the justiciability doctrine that concerns the limits upon legal issues over which a court can exercise its judicial authority. In this chapter the author tries to deal with the very controversial question of justiciability from an objective standpoint (page 9-15) and argues that the civil law countries also observe the non-justiciability doctrine. This chapter considers various aspects of justiciability and distinguishes it into lato sensu and stricto sensu; evaluates legal and political side of justiciability; analyses justiciability in domestic setting (the US, Canada, Germany and Israel); understands it in the international arena; and reviews the doctrine of justiciability in the framework of the institution of arbitration. The author describes justiciability lato sensu as those factors that do not permanently affect the non-justiciable issue. However, in case of justiciability stricto sensu the factors that affect the non-justiciability are rooted within the issue and are not reversible unless there is a change in the very heart of the issue. This chapter also explores practical application of the justiciability doctrine in jurisprudence of the ICJ and the Permanent Court of the International Justice. Citing the Canadian Supreme Court cases of Same Sex Marriages and re Secession as an example, the author argues that the ICJ should have decline to provide the Advisory Opinion on the security fence based on its political nature. Solomon is of the view that using the non-justiciability doctrine could have preserved the Court’s prestige.

Chapter II covers the most challenging aspect of the practical application of the contentious doctrine of non-justiciability by applying it to the Advisory Opinion. The author argues that even though the case had a legal side, ‘yet in the balance between law and politics, the scales tend to tilt towards the later’ (page 75). From the UN GA’s perspective the Advisory Opinion was rendered on the premise that the security fence did not serve just a defensive role but also a political one, as Israel’s border to the east and as a means of annexing de facto the big settlement blocs inside Israel (page 76). Quoting Araujo, the author argues that Court hinted that if the fence was erected along the Green Line and not on occupied territory, the fence could have been considered legal. Solomon is of the view that since the legality of fence was attached to legality of settlements the Court was compelled to align with one of the two narratives i.e. either consider settlement illegal and uphold international humanitarian law and protect Palestinian’s or condon the existence of the fence and protect the right to life of Israeli settlers. The author argues that even if the Court would apply international law in these scenarios the outcome would be substantially political depending on how the Court chooses to view these issues. In the first scenario the conclusion would be that settlements are illegal and should be dismantled, and in the latter situation erection of the security fence would serve to protect the Israeli settlers.

Solomon argues that for the political nature of the issue, the Court should have declined to render an opinion as nature of the subject was ingrained as non-justiciability stricto sensu. He further argues that presence of political nature leads to the non-justiciability lato sensu due to the ultra vires character of the requesting resolution, bias of Judge Elaraby (Israel was against the participation of Justice Elaraby in rending of the Advisory Opinion due to his role as a representative of Egypt in the UN and he played a major role in the context of the Emergency Special Session of the UN GA, which later requested for the Advisory Opinion), the political motives behind the request, its high technical character as well as substantial lack of evidence on the route of the fence. Solomon concludes that the Advisory Opinion provides a practical illustration of how political character of a case is “not premised upon the specific constellation of an individual case, but rather is attached to the issue itself. There could be issues and disputes which, although according to both the objective and the subjective theories of justiciability as well as the ‘out of cage’ approach, can be fully ‘legal’, yet still the Court should declare them as ‘political’ and not adjudicate on them” (page 78).

Chapter III discusses the careful attitude of the Israeli Supreme Court to the ICJ Advisory Opinion and how it allowed penetration of international law into the domestic sphere (page 178). The chapter discusses the two Israeli Supreme Court cases and explains how the Court balanced various legal and political issues. In the first ruling on the security fence, the Supreme Court in the Sourik case set the standards balancing conflicting rights and the remedy of proportionality. These standards were also used by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case to examine the legality of project for the construction of fence (page 145). Solomon while discussing this case explains how the Court tried to find a balance between the military commander’s action on the route, the Israeli security needs and the rights of the local Palestinian population by applying the threesome proportionality test. By applying this test the Court came to the conclusion that certain parts of the fence route did not comply with the proportionality standards and that the security provided outbalanced the harm to Palestinians (page 147). The author is of the view that the Court by its coherent jurisprudence, set the issue on a more realistic basis by disconnecting legality of settlement and their protection and hence avoided expressing a stance on the legality of Israel’s settlement policy and also managed to condone the security fence without condoning the Israeli settlement (page 152). This chapter also considers the criticism of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beit Sourik. The author also discusses the second major case of Mara’abe where the Israeli Supreme Court related to the three criteria established in Beit Sourik case. The Court determined that Israeli government and military must within a reasonable period, reconsider various alternatives for the fence route. The Supreme Court took a careful stance to relate to the Advisory Opinion thus allowing respect of international legal system but proceeded to examine the relation of international law to the Israeli reality.

This book has various positive attributes. The first strength of this book is its subject matter i.e. the justiciability of the international disputes. This book is perhaps the first of its kind that analysed the justiciability of the Advisory Opinion as lato sensu and stricto sensu by referring to the international disputes that are suitable for adjudication. Secondly, the representative international and domestic cases chosen in various jurisdictions are useful to assist the reader to understand the Israeli point of view. Solomon interplays this dynamics to illustrate that it is possible to bypass critical political questions by the national courts and yet allow penetration of international law into the domestic sphere. Thirdly, the book provides a thorough comparison of Israeli domestic cases with the Advisory Opinion making the book useful to Israeli and international practitioners. Fourthly, this book skillfully forces legal practitioners to think out of box and realize that certain issues cannot be solved by legal means and there is a need to balance the conflicting interests ‘rather their submission to court of law from which one side emerges the victor and the other the vanquished’ (page 181).

Hardly any legal scholarship is ever perfect and this book is no exception. There are a few aspects that I would like to highlight for the author’s consideration in the next edition. Firstly it is not clearly explained as to why the adjudication of the Israeli Supreme Court on the security fence could not be classified as non-justiciable as the Court was essentially dealing with the similar issues as the ICJ, legal v political even though it avoided the question of settlement. In other words why did not the Israeli Supreme Court exercise its discretion to avoid deciding the security fence case as it also involves a political issue, which is regarded as non-justiciable? Further, the author chooses not to explore in-depth why the ICJ is not concerned with justiciability of the disputes and why does the presence of political issue in a case not bar the ICJ from exercising jurisdiction over the matter, even though it may exercise its discretionary power under Article 65 (1) and Article 92. These critical questions could have been evaded if the author had limited its area of research by explaining it in the introductory chapter, which is very short. Since these questions are not tackled at some occasions it seems as if author is providing a legal justification on behalf of Israel for disregarding the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion. Addressing of these issues in the introductory chapter could have made this research more balanced.

In my view this book would have gained significantly by the author including a section on non-judicial resolution of the Middle East dispute and how the Advisory Opinion by ICJ affected the Middle East peace process. The author touches upon this aspect by noting that the Middle East conflict cannot be viewed monolithically from just legal field and the hope that the two peoples will learn from past failures to make use of the guidance that the applicable international law principles provide, refers both to human rights and humanitarian law’ (page 180-81). However, this statement is not explained. It is true that advisory jurisdiction represents a step forward in the development of international law towards the universal jurisdiction of the ICJ, and is a very flexible tool in international adjudication. However, the Advisory Opinion involved many difficult and delicate political issues involving the Middle East, the relations between Arab States, Palestine and Israel that had a direct link with the peace process. The Advisory Opinion upset one party, Israel, without whose cooperation no resolution is possible to the Palestine problem. It is clear that although the Advisory Opinion may clarify law, it cannot permanently resolve the issues that still fuel the tensions in the Middle East pertaining to Israel and Palestine. Therefore, both objective and equitable political action and the rule of law are essential to ensure that Israel and Palestine do not rely on fences to make good neighbours as clearly it has exacerbated the relations between the two communities.

Overall, Solomon’s book remains a valuable contribution not only to understanding the Israeli perspective on the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the construction of security fence but also to identify with the concept of justiciability and its relevance to international disputes. Solomon’s book is a work of admirable research and a very good addition to library of practitioners, academics and students in the field of law, social science and security studies.

View this book here: http://www.wolfpublishers.com/book.php?id=502

UN General Assembly Recognizes Right to Water as a Human Right

Yesterday, on 28 July 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution introduced by Bolivia on the human right to access to clean water and sanitation. The Resolution was adopted by 122 in favour, no votes against and 41 abstentions (for the press release of the UN General Assembly see here, for the text of the Resolution see here).

In the key provisions of the Resolution the General Assembly:

“1. Declares the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights;

2. Calls upon States and international organizations to provide financial resources, capacity-building and technology transfer, through international assistance and cooperation, in particular to developing countries, in order to scale up efforts to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all;“

The Resolution’s first Article notably highlights the interconnectedness of the right to water and sanitation with other human rights. That said, it remains vague as to what this right actually comprises and what exactly the respective States’ obligation are. While the Resolution is not legally binding on the UN Member States as international treaties are, its adoption may have wide-ranging political (and indirectly also legal) implications and will hopefully help to raise awareness for the grave lack of clean water from which more than 800 million people suffer.

It should be noted that while the right to water is not explicitly laid down by the UN Human Rights Treaties, it is arguably covered by these treaties to the extent that it is necessary for the respect of the right to life and personal integrity as well as for the realisation various other human rights. States have, hence, already an obligation to provide access to water to the people in their jurisdiction. In this regard, it may also be interesting to note that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted the right to life as encompassing a right to a life in dignity which also extends to certain basic needs.

The ICJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo

The website of the ICJ stills seems to be overwhelmed by users so here is the advisory opinion as a pdf: ICJ Advisory Opinion Kosovo. More coverage will follow.

Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence In Accordance with International Law

A brief summary of the Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 in the Kosovo case

As customary, the Court dealt first with the issue of whether it had jurisdiction and in turn whether it should exercise its discretion and refuse to answer the question (paras. 17-48). This part is rather interesting in that it clarifies the powers of the General Assembly and its relationship with the Security Council. Having found that it had jurisdiction and that there were no compelling reasons not to answer the question the Court turned to the the scope and meaning of the question on which the General Assembly had requested that it give its opinion. Recalling that in some previous cases it has departed from the language of the question put to it where the question was not adequately formulated, the Court found that in the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly was clearly formulated.

Scope and meaning of the question

As the Court stated (para. 51):

“The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State.”

As the Court noted, it was not required by the question to take a position on whether international law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence or, a fortiori, on whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities situated within a State unilaterally to break away from it. Thus, the Court left aside issues of self-determination and remedial secession and focused on whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence did violate international law.

Identity of the authors of the declaration of independence (paras. 102-109)

 

According to the Court, the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence was a matter capable of affecting the answer to the question whether that declaration was in accordance with international law. Having considered certain features of the text of the declaration and the circumstances of its adoption the Court arrived at the conclusion that, taking all factors together, the authors of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration.

Factual background leading to the Declaration of Independence of 17 February 2008 (paras. 57-77)

Having determined that the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 must be considered within the factual context which led to its adoption, the Court briefly described the relevant characteristics of the framework put in place by the Security Council to ensure the interim administration of Kosovo, namely, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. The Court then proceeded with a brief description of the developments relating to the so-called “final status process” in the years preceding the adoption of the declaration of independence, before turning to the events of 17 February 2008.

The Question Whether the Declaration of Independence Is in Accordance with International Law (paras. 77-121)

The Court looked first to certain questions concerning the lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law, against the background of which the question posed fell to be considered, and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) is to be understood and applied. After having determined the general framework, the Court turned to the legal relevance of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), and considered whether the resolution created special rules, and ensuing obligations, under international law applicable to the issues raised by the request and having a bearing on the lawfulness of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008.

General international law (paras. 79-84)

The Court held that during the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were numerous instances of declarations of independence, often strenuously opposed by the State from which independence was being declared. In no case, however, did State practice as a whole suggest that the act of promulgating the declaration was regarded as contrary to international law. On the contrary, State practice during this period pointed clearly to the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of declarations of independence. During the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.

In dealing with the contention that a prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle of territorial integrity, the Court held that the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States. The Court also confirmed that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council; exceptions being the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never taken this position. According to the Court, general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence; thus, the Kosovo’s declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law.

Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the UNMIK Constitutional Framework created thereunder (paras. 85-121)

The Court noted that none of the participants had questioned the fact that resolution 1244 (1999), which specifically deals with the situation in Kosovo, is part of the law relevant in the present situation. Subsequently, the Court stated that the Constitutional Framework derives its binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law. In that sense it therefore possessed an international legal character.

The Court next observed three distinct features of resolution 1244, relevant for discerning its object and purpose. First, resolution 1244 (1999) established an international civil and security presence in Kosovo with full civil and political authority and sole responsibility for the governance of Kosovo. Secondly, the solution embodied in resolution 1244 (1999), namely, the implementation of an interim international territorial administration, was designed for humanitarian purposes: to provide a means for the stabilization of Kosovo and for the re-establishment of a basic public order in an area beset by crisis. Thirdly, resolution 1244 (1999) clearly established an interim régime; it cannot be understood as putting in place a permanent institutional framework in the territory of Kosovo. This resolution mandated UNMIK merely to facilitate the desired negotiated solution for Kosovo’s future status, without prejudging the outcome of the negotiating process. The Court thus concluded that the object and purpose of resolution 1244 (1999) was to establish a temporary, exceptional legal régime which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian legal order and which aimed at the stabilization of Kosovo, and that it was designed to do so on an interim basis.

Having earlier established the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence, the Court turned to the question whether their act in promulgating the declaration was contrary to any prohibition contained in Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework adopted thereunder (paras. 110-121).

First, the Court observed that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) was essentially designed to create an interim régime for Kosovo, with a view to channelling the long-term political process to establish its final status. The resolution did not contain any provision dealing with the final status of Kosovo or with the conditions for its achievement. Hence, according to the Court, Resolution 1244 (1999) did not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: unlike resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo.

Secondly, turning to the question of the addressees of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the Court determined that there was no indication, in the text of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), that the Security Council intended to impose, beyond that, a specific obligation to act or a prohibition from acting, addressed to such other actors. The Court concluded that, this part of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) cannot be construed to include a prohibition, addressed in particular to the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008, against declaring independence. The Court accordingly found that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from issuing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia. Hence, the declaration of independence did not violate Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

The Court turned to the question whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 violated the Constitutional Framework established under the auspices of UNMIK. Having found that the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in which those Provisional Institutions operated, the Court found that the declaration of independence did not violate the 2001 Constitutional Framework.

General conclusion (para. 122)

Having concluded that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework, the Court stated that consequently, the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law.

The Court unanimously decided that it had jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested.

By nine votes to five it decided to comply with the request for an advisory opinion.

By ten votes to four the Court held:

[The Court] Is of the opinion that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law.

Advisory Opinion on the Kosovo Case to be rendered on 22 July

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Kosovo case will be delivered on 22 July, at 3.00 p.m, by the President of the Court, H.E. Hisashi Owada.

The question about the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 was submitted to the Court through resolution 63/3 (A/63/L.2) of 8 October 2008 by the United Nations General Assembly (based on a draft resolution sponsored by Serbia).The question put before the Court is: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”.

Thirty seven States, including Kosovo, submitted their written submissions in the first phase of the written proceedings (17 April 2009). Fifteen States, including Kosovo, submitted written comments on the other written statements in the second phase of the written proceedings (17 July 2009). 29 States, including Kosovo, participated in the oral proceedings which took place from 1-11 December 2009. As the numbers themselves indicate, this case has attracted a lot of attention. At present Kosovo is recognized by 69 States. In a recent resolution, the European Parliament called on the five EU states that have not recognized Kosovo this far, to do so in the near future.

Having myself been closely involved in these legal proceedings on behalf of Albania, I cannot really wait to hear the advisory opinion of the Court. Hopefully, this advisory opinion will contribute to the consolidation of peace and friendly relations in the Balkans.

Update of the Oxford Reports on International Law

The Oxford Reports on International Law, which is a collection of case law reports from international law courts around the world, was updated this week and now includes 3,000 cases! When OUP launched the service, back in September 2008, it had 785 cases – an increase of 2,215 cases in just under 2 years.

The Oxford Reports on International Law sits alongside the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, and OUP presents it as being a ‘sister’ service, as so much of the content on both resources is linked together (through the Oxford Law Citator).

Cases covered in Oxford Reports on International Law include those from the International Court of Justice, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, International Criminal Court, European Court of Human Rights, UN Human Rights Committee, and many more courts around the world.

Thanks to Nik Speller at OUP for drawing my attention to this.

European Parliament approves SWIFT Agreement

On Thursday 7 July 2010, the European Parliament approved the new SWIFT-Agreement on bank data transfers to the United States for counter-terrorist purposes (see the press release of the European Parliament). The Draft Agreement provides for mass bank data transfers upon request by the US authorities with a view to identifying suspected terrorists. It is important to note though that only financial transactions to non-EU countries will be covered by the new agreement. Article 4 of the Draft Agreement specifically precludes transfers between EU member states.

The political debate in the run-up of the adoption of this agreement was highly controversial. In February, the European Parliament rejected the first version of the Draft Agreement, an impressive demonstration of the Parliament’s new competences on judicial and police cooperation under the Treaty of Lisbon (for further information see here). The main reasons for the rejection related to data protection, in particular the limitation of the data amount that may be transferred to the US and the prevention of abuse of the data transfers.

In this regard, the Parliament had come up with a number of conditions for its approval of a new Agreement. Among other things, transfers of unfiltered mass data, the so-called “bulk” data transfers should be prevented and the nature and the amount of data should be limited. Furthermore, the Parliament claimed that only persons that are qualified as terrorists by the EU should be covered by the Agreement. Also, the Parliament claimed that the decision to transfer the data to the EU should be subject to judicial control.

It seems that these concerns of the Parliament are hardly reflected in the new Draft Agreement. The transfer of “bulk data” is explicitly allowed. The only concession that the Parliament won in this regard is that the EU has to start working on a “Terrorism Finance Tracking Program” equivalent to that of the US that would eventually remove the need for bulk data transfers since the EU could then do the data analysis itself. However, it is unclear when this system would be established and there is no specific schedule indicated in the Agreement. If this system is not established within five years the Parliament may ask for denouncing the Agreement but it unclear whether the Parliament would make use of this power.

What is more, the US authorities decide how the data packages to be transferred are composed. The data request is not controlled by any judicial authority but by the EU authority for police cooperation (Europol). This entails various problems because Europol is not an independent judicial authority; rather it is mainly controlled by representatives of the Member States’ Governments, i.e. the executive. Some argue that even the prior solution, i.e. that the bank’s association SWIFT checks the data requests, would have provided more data security. The reason for this is that SWIFT had at least a certain economic interest in protecting its clients’ data while Europol crucially depends on the information and cooperation of the US authorities, and hence on their political goodwill.

US investigation authorities may safe the data obtained from the EU for five years. An EU official seconded to the US authorities is entrusted with supervising the correct application of the Agreement.

Given that the safeguards introduced into the new Draft Agreement are remarkably low and do not at all meet the conditions which the Parliament announced earlier, it is surprising that the Parliament did not block the Agreement a second time. Indeed, the situation has only marginally changed. Nonetheless, the Socialist, the Liberal and the Conservative group voted in favour of the Draft Agreement, with only the Green and the Left-wing group voting against. It may be suspected that overarching political considerations of counter-terrorist policy and the concern not to profoundly upset the United States may have contributed to the change of mind of the Members of Parliament.

That said, it seems that the dispute on the Agreement is not yet completely over. The Parliament’s Green Group is currently preparing a legal expert opinion on the legality of the Agreement. The focus is on whether the EU actually has the competence to conclude an agreement on the mass transfer of data. It may be suspected that also fundamental rights concerns may play a role in the legal assessment. Depending on the outcome of the legal analysis the Green Group may file a legal action against the Agreement before the European Court of Justice in order to obtain by means of legal recourse what they failed to achieve politically: the prevention of the Agreement’s application (for a statement of the Green Group see here, for further information see here, here and here).

In Memoriam: Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad

This post is authored by Dr Elena Katselli and Dr Zeray Yihdego.

Professor Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad: A Tribute to a Great Professor and a Wonderful Human Being

On July 1, 2010, Professor Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, formerly at Durham University and most recently at Brunel University, passed away leaving an irreplaceable void. Not only was he a great Professor of International Law who made significant contributions and who shared his passion, knowledge and wisdom in the field with everyone around him, but he was also a Humanist, a reliable Friend, a Gentleman, and a wonderful Human Being.

As his students, we enjoyed his continuous support and encouragement throughout the years, his humbleness, and the broadness of his spirit. However, his premature death has not left us an opportunity to show him our appreciation and admiration, and how much he influenced our lives in so many positive ways.

Professor Kaikobad’s example will always inspire us and will always enlighten our hearts. He will be greatly missed but he will certainly not be forgotten.

Elena Katselli and Zeray Yihdego

Comment on the Review Conference of the Rome Statute

The following is a commentary by Bukeni Waruzi, Program Manager for Africa and the Middle East, WITNESS, on the recent Review Conference of the Rome Statute.

The Review Conference of the Rome Statute held in Kampala, Uganda from May 31- June 11, 2010 aimed to make critical improvements to the statute on specific issues: to determine the crime of aggression and stocktaking of several areas of improvements to international criminal law. The areas included enforcement, co-operation, complementarity, peace and justice, impacts of the Rome Statute on victims and affected communities, etc.

I was lucky to attend such an important event in the history of international criminal justice, and I went there with deep hope and expectations. I expected the delegates to make profound improvements to the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) and complete critical areas in it that remained incomplete since the Rome Conference establishing the Rome Statute in 1998.

The debates were both exciting and disappointing. Exciting to see how determined the delegates were to tackle toughest issues of international criminal justice such as the crime of aggression.

[For the purpose of the statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the character of the United Nations.]

The definition of the crime of aggression was agreed upon as well as some aspects of jurisdiction. But I was disappointed to see the delegates not able to compromise in a non-political manner on critical areas of discussion: jurisdiction of the crime of aggression and many of the compromises were superficial.

Notably, the main area of discussion was the crime of aggression. The discussions were heated and the politics were all over, as the saying goes “where politicians are debating it is just about politics more than anything else.”

Here is where the some disappointing compromises happened, which cannot guarantee the independence and the neutrality of the Rome Statute. For example, one of the compromises on the jurisdiction on the crime of aggression calls upon the United Nations Security Council to determine if there’s ground to believe that “an act of aggression” was committed. We all know the influence that powerful nations have at the Security Council and being itself a political body how will it effectively determine a commission of an act of aggression without political influence? Furthermore, the possible delay in the Council’s deliberations might impact the Prosecutor’s agenda especially in tracking evidence: witnesses may not be able to wait for longtime.

On this particular crime of aggression, non-state parties (States that are not part to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court i.e. which haven’t ratified and/or signed the Rome statute) were very active and influential in debates and were even able to get their resolution or understanding included. The USA, Russia and China were, at least this time, not very much divided and were able to influence the final resolutions on the jurisdiction on the crime of aggression. While they were fighting to get non-state parties out of the jurisdiction of the crime of aggression, at least it was accepted that only a state party can declare the non-acceptance to the crime of aggression.

Despite the power of the politics, we’ve come a long way from the Nuremberg tribunal and Tokyo military tribunal to the ad hoc tribunals for Sierra Leone, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to the ICC. International criminal justice has made real progress and the fight against impunity is on the agenda of all nations.

The Review Conference, which gathered 111 state parties to the Rome Statute and several other non-state parties, demonstrated the determination of the international community to make no tolerance on impunity.

As I was following the debates and the political negotiations to get resolutions passed, I came to the conclusion that politics are at play even in issues of criminal justice. And this made me question the real independence and the effectiveness of such a young institution like the ICC.

I had an overall optimistic point of view; the steps achieved at the Review Conference should not be underestimated; at least the states have fully compromised on the definition of the crime of aggression which means states can therefore start implementing it in their domestic jurisdiction. But, it’ll take time and real political will to get the entire issue of the crime of aggression resolved, certainly we’ll get there one day. 

Sweden and the Universal Periodic Review in the Human Rights Council

Introduction

During its tenth session the Working Group[1] on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the Human Rights Council (HRC), on 7 May 2010 held its first review of the Swedish human rights record. Sweden had submitted its report on national protection of human rights on 22 February 2010.[2] During the review a number of noteworthy issues were discussed regarding the human rights situation in Sweden, and they were summarized in the draft report of the Working Group on 14 May 2010.[3] In the following I will shortly present the Universal Periodic Review process and then draw the attention to some of these problems, which despite the high reputation of Sweden’s human rights record are recurring ones. 

On the Universal Periodic Review

The Universal Periodic Review is a process which involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN Member States once every four years; 48 States are being reviewed every year.[4] The UPR is a State-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which provides the opportunity for each State to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfill their human rights obligations. The UPR was created in March 2006 by the UNGA[5] as part of the Human Rights Council itself. It is a co-operative process which started in 2008 and by 2011 will have reviewed the human rights records of every country.[6] Germany was reviewed during the 4th session in 2009,[7] Norway during the 6th Session in 2009,[8] Finland during the 1st Session in 2008.[9],[10] The UPR is one of the key elements of the new Council which reminds States of their responsibility to fully respect and implement all human rights and fundamental freedoms. The overall aim of the UPR is to improve the human rights situation in all countries and address human rights violations wherever they occur on the basis of equal treatment for every country. Read more »

Sami Land Rights – The ECtHR Judgment in the Case of Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden

On 30 March 2010 the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), sitting as a Chamber, issued its judgement in the case Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden.[1] The case concerns the rights of the Sami[2] to use privately owned land for winter grazing of their reindeers in the municipality of Härjedalen. The case originates in proceedings before Swedish courts that were initiated by a large number of private landowners against the Sami villages, and which were concluded in substance with a Court of Appeal judgment prohibiting the villages from using land without previously concluding a contract with the affected landowners. The ECtHR in a decision of 17 February 2009 declared inadmissible inter alia the complaint by the Sami villages that a violation had occurred of their property rights under Art. 1 of Additional Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR.[3] As a consequence the new judgment merely deals with the procedural aspects of the cases before the national courts, namely the alleged excessiveness of the costs and length of those proceedings. However, as I will demonstrate those questions in themselves add some important points to the contentious question of Sami land and resource rights in Sweden. It is therefore justified to take a closer look at the judgment of the ECtHR and to analyse its ramifications for the underlying disputes. I will hence just shortly refer to the substantive details of the judgment and instead focus on outlining the overall importance of the ruling for the fundamental dispute regarding Sami land rights and the future situation of the Sami villages.

1. Background of the Case – The Proceedings before National Courts

On 20 September 1990 a large number of private land owners instituted proceedings against five Sami villages, seeking a declaratory judgement (negativ fastställelsetalan) to the effect that the Sami villages do not have the right to reindeer grazing on their lands without a valid contract concluded between the landowners and the village(s). The villages, instead, claimed that they had the right to winter grazing within their respective areas based on (I) prescription from time immemorial (urminnes hävd); (II) the provisions of the applicable reindeer husbandry act;[5] (III) custom; and (IV) public international law in the form of Art. 27 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[6] Between 1992-1995 the parties presented vast amounts of evidence in support of their claims. The case was also joined with two other actions brought by landowners, resulting in the final judgment affecting the property of 571 landowners. A judgment was rendered by the District Court on 21 February 1996, finding that there had not been, between the 16th and the late 19th century, any winter grazing that could result in an existing right of the Sami to such grazing on private properties on the basis of prescription from time immemorial; such prescription requiring at least 90 years of usage.[7] The Reindeer Husbandry Act, which also presupposes prescription from time immemorial (see Section 1 subsection 2 in fine), could not yield a different conclusion. The court furthermore found that a right to real property could not be established on custom and that the claimed right could also not be based on the ICCPR. Hence the court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The judgement was appealed by the Sami villages on 15 March 1996. Following numerous submissions from the parties, decisions on procedural issues and the withdrawal of some landowners from the case, the court of appeal (Hovrätten över Nedre Norrland) upheld the district court’s judgement on 15 February 2002. The applicants on 19 March 2002 appealed to the Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) which, however, on 29 April 2004 refused leave of appeal.

2. Proceedings Before the ECtHR

On 29 October 2004 four Sami villages submitted an application under Art. 34 ECHR (Individual Applications) requesting the ECtHR to declare that (I) the limitations regarding the Sami villages’ rights to winter grazing following from the domestic procedures did not meet the requirement in Art. 1 Protocol No. 1 ECHR that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law; (II) that the limitations were not proportionate to the aim sought (hence in violation of Art. 1 Protocol No. 1 ECHR); (III) that the costs of the procedure effectively prevents the villages from protecting their rights through court procedures (i.e. a violation of Art. 6 ECHR); (IV) and that the time of the procedures before the national judiciary was unreasonable and in violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR.

The ECtHR issued its decision on the admissibility of the application on 17 February 2009, holding it admissible only with regard to the claim of lack of access to court, given the high costs and the unreasonable length of the proceedings.

2. a. The Substantive Issue – Is the Right to Reindeer Grazing a Protected Property/Possession?

Although the question if the right to reindeer grazing is a protected property was not subject of the present judgment, as it was considered inadmissible, it is of some importance, for the understanding of the case as a whole, to touch upon some of the legal arguments in this regard. The applicants alleged a violation of the right to property/possessions, as protected under Art. 1 Protocol No. 1.[8] The Court thus firstly had to determine if there was a “possession” in the sense of Art. 1 Protocol No. 1, which could be either in the form of an “existing possession” or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant has a legitimate expectation of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right.[9]

(I) According to Section 3 Reindeer Husbandry Act the winter grazing may be carried out in areas outside the reindeer grazing mountains, which is the core area of the Sami, if since time immemorial such reindeer grazing has occurred during certain times of the year. Whether or not this right exists has to be determined by the courts on the basis of evidence of prescription of time immemorial.[10] This implies that the interest of the Sami villages is only in the form of a claim, not as an “existing possession”. (II) Whether or not the applicants had a legitimate expectation with regard to obtaining an asset in the form of winter grazing rights is according to the case-law of the ECtHR[11] determined by if the right has sufficient basis in national law; for example where national courts have confirmed or rejected it in their case-law. A look at such case law of the Swedish courts reveals that the existence of any right to reindeer husbandry has always been made dependent on sufficient evidence provided by the applicants in support of a right based on time immemorial. In the present case the ECtHR did not find any reason to criticize the assessment made in this regard by the Swedish District Court or the Court of Appeal.[12] The Court thus merely acknowledges the system established by the Reindeer Husbandry Act and states that only in very exceptional cases, namely where an appearance of arbitrariness in the national courts’ determination of the applicants’ claim is revealed,[13] can the Strasbourg Court provide a remedy for violations of a right.

With these findings the ECtHR put the Sami villages in a difficult situation: it had been confirmed that the national courts must make a decision in every individual case based on evidence presented. The villages had not reached, however, that the situation for the Sami under the Swedish legislation (the Reindeer Husbandry Act), was criticized as being too burdensome for the Sami, in particular as regards their obligation to prove prescription of time immemorial. The only remaining way to criticize this issue in the continuing proceedings was to stress the violation of Art. 6 ECHR due to the length of proceedings and high costs that were a necessary outcome of the Reindeer Husbandry Act and the burden of proof on the villages.

2. b. Violation of Art. 6 ECHR with Regard to Effective Access to Court

With regard to the claim that the high procedural costs barred the applicants from presenting their case effectively, inter alia because the applicants as legal entities did not qualify for legal aid under the Legal Aid Act,[14] the Court held that Art. 6(1) ECHR shall guarantee practical and effective rights[15] but that States have a free choice of the means to guarantee litigants that right. This choice may e.g. include the institution of legal aid schemes or the simplification of applicable court procedures. The need to provide (financial) support is reliant on the importance of what is at stake for the applicants, the complexity of the applicable law, and the applicants’ capacity to represent themselves effectively.[16] The court found that the issue to be determined was of considerable importance for the applicants[17] and that the case as a whole was of a complex nature.[18] Yet the ECtHR also concluded that the applicants’ conduct of their defense did not indicate that they were unable to present their case properly (they had legal counsel throughout the proceedings in the national courts, were able to present large amounts of material in support of their claims etc.);[19] hence there was not considered to be any inequality of arms involving a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR.[20]

2. c. Violation of Art. 6 ECHR in Regard to the Length of Proceedings

As concerns the length of the proceedings, possibly constituting a violation of Art. 6 ECHR, the ECtHR stated that the reasonableness of the duration must be determined in the individual case with regard to (I) the complexity of the case, (II) the conduct of the applicants and relevant authorities, and (III) what was at stake for the applicants.[21] The case at hand was deemed to be of great complexity but the ECtHR considered that the overall duration of the proceedings – 13 years and 7 months – were not sufficiently expeditious. Especially there were unnecessary delays[22] which ultimately lead to the proceedings being excessive and hence in violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR.[23]

2. d. Just Satisfaction under Art. 41 ECHR

All four Sami villages were awarded a joint sum of 14,000 EUR for non-pecuniary damage; no compensation was awarded to individual Sami for distress (the prolonged proceedings and the high costs were claimed to have lead to emotional distress and suicides). By way of costs and expenses (cf. Art. 41 ECHR) the Court awarded the applicants satisfaction with a joint sum of 15,000 EUR, corresponding to the costs that were actually and necessarily caused[24] in relation to the excessive length of the national proceedings, which were mainly caused by the Supreme Court.

3. Assessment

Notwithstanding the recognized violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR due to the excessive length of proceedings before the Swedish courts, the judgment is only a minor victory for the Sami villages. The applicants had hoped that, despite the decision on inadmissibility from February 2009, the adverse situation of the Sami in Sweden would have been highlighted again by showing that the Sami had an excessive burden of proof to satisfy the requirement of prescription from time immemorial. Indeed the decision did go against the applicants in the sense that the ECtHR determined that there was no inequality of arms vis-à-vis the landowners under the Reindeer Husbandry Act; at least no inequality amounting to a violation of Art. 6(1) ECHR. Hence the Sami villages, in order to have their right to use winter grazing areas acknowledged, have to continue to provide extensive evidence in support of an area having traditionally been used for winter grazing.

Another auxiliary concern that is underlined with the judgement in this case is the precarious economic situation of the Sami villages. According to the Reindeer Husbandry Act the Sami villages are prohibited from exercising any other economic business than reindeer husbandry.[25] Although this does not prevent individual Sami from running businesses, it nevertheless makes it difficult for the villages, as those with the interest in the land rights, to initiate any legal proceedings against a large number of land owners. This financial inequality between the parties should have been highlighted more by the ECtHR: whereas surely the ECtHR considered that the villages had legal counsel throughout the proceedings in the national courts and were able to present large amounts of material in support of their claims, it should e.g. have been recognized that the length of proceedings was also caused by the difficulty of the villages to produce the necessary evidence. Furthermore, a large number of legal proceedings against Sami villages in the past years (not only in Sweden but also in Norway and Finland) have contributed to a very insecure financial situation of the Sami.

The case must be seen in light of the fact that Sweden has not yet ratified the ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.[26] And there are “good” reasons for Sweden’s inaction: Art. 14 of the Convention would not only demand Sweden to recognize “[t]he rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy” but demand positive action from the Government in the sense that it

“shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession.”

In other words, the Convention would take away the burden of proof from the Sami and instead put it on the Government. Moreover, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) reiterated in its 2008 concluding observations regarding the periodic report of Sweden under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination[27]

“its concern regarding … land disputes [and the] de facto discrimination against the Sami in legal disputes, as the burden of proof for land ownership rests exclusively with the Sami, and about the lack of legal aid provided to Sami villages as litigants.”[28]

The CERD recommended that Sweden grant necessary legal aid to Sami villages in court disputes concerning land and grazing rights and invited Sweden to introduce legislation providing for a shared burden of proof in cases regarding Sami land and grazing rights.[29] Judge Ziemle from Latvia, in her partly dissenting opinion in the case before the ECtHR also underlined this and stated that although the substantive issue of the Sami’s property rights was not part of the present case – as the case had been declared inadmissible on this question – and although the ECtHR did not have to rule on a claim of discrimination, the Court should nevertheless have seen the de facto discrimination as the main reason behind the ineffective access to court.

According to the legal counsel of the Sami villages,[30] the applicants will seek a referral of the case to the Grand Chamber pursuant to Art. 43 ECHR. Especially the counsel representing the villages wants to get the Grand Chamber to review the question that was declared inadmissible by the Chamber in its decision of February 2009 (the violation of right to property), something that will be difficult, or to at least have the Grand Chamber discuss the question of the insufficient wording of the Swedish legislation, the Reindeer Husbandry Act, under the heading of access to court (i.e. length of the procedure) or the costs of the proceedings. The reason is to be found in the current negotiations between the Sami villages and the private land owners (and the Government) on their right to let their reindeers graze on larger areas. The Government on its part has stated that it is not interested in referring the case to the Grand Chamber. However, the Government is under increased pressure to solve the disputes between itself and private landowners on the one side and Sami villages on the other. Only some weeks ago Sweden was criticized for its relations with the Sami in the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Working Group of the Human Rights Council.[31] The main suggestion to remedy the situation was to adopt the ILO Convention No. 169 and to amend the Reindeer Husbandry Act.


[1] Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 39013/04, Judgment of 30 March 2010 (hereinafter: Handölsdalen Judgement), available at <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=39013/04&sessionid=52273189&skin=hudoc-en>.

[2] The Sami are an indigenous people of northern Europe inhabiting Sápmi, which today encompasses parts of northern Sweden, Norway, Finland and the Kola Peninsula of Russia but also in the border area between south and middle Sweden.

[3] Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Paris, 20 March 1952, available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm>. Art. 1 Protocol No. 1:

Article 1 – Protection of property

Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

[5] The latest and current one being the Rennäringslag, SFS 1971:437 (Reindeer Husbandry Act).

[6] Article 27

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

[7] Cf. B. Bengtsson, Samerätt – En översikt, at 79 (2004).

[8] Cf. above note 3.

[9] Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 39013/04, Handölsdalens Sami Village and Others v. Sweden, 17 February 2009 (hereinafter: Decision as to the Admissibility), available at <http://www.ere.se/doc/ptbeslut.pdf>. The Court here referred to its judgement in Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], Application No. 44912/98, ECHR 2004-IX, para. 35.

[10] Decision as to the Admissibility, para. 50.

[11] Besides Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC] the ECtHR referred to Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], Application No. 63235/00, 19 April 2007, para. 94.

[12] Decision as to the Admissibility, para. 54 in fine.

[13] On the limited power of the ECtHR to deal with alleged errors of fact or law committed by the national courts, see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], Application No. 30544/96, ECHR 1999-I, para. 28.

[14] Rättshjälpslag, SFS 1972:429 (Legal Aid Act). Pursuant to Section 6 only physical persons may be eligible for aid under the legal aid act.

[15] Handölsdalen Judgement, para. 51.

[16] Id.

[17] Id. para. 54. Referring inter alia to the fact that winter grazing on the land of 571 landowners was at question.

[18] Id. para. 55. Referring inter alia to the analysis of reindeer husbandry over several centuries and the need gfor the applicants to show that the right to winter grazing was unchallenged for 90 years.

[19] Id. para. 57.

[20] Id. para. 59 in fine.

[21] The ECHR here referred to its judgement in Frydlander v. France [GC], Application No. 30979/96, ECHR 2000-VII, para. 43.

[22] E.g. it took the Supreme Court one year and two and a half months to refuse the applicants leave to appeal in regard to the procedural questions and two years to refuse leave to appeal based on the substance of the case. Cf. Handölsdalen Judgement, para. 65.

[23] Handölsdalen Judgement, para. 66.

[24] This is based on the earlier case-law of the ECHR in the case T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC] (Application No. 28945/95, 10 May 2001, para. 120) according to which only legal costs and expenses found to have been actually and necessarily incurred and which are reasonable was to the quantum are recoverable under Art. 41 ECHR.

[25] §9(3) Rennäringslag, SFS 1971:437

[26] Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) (1989) 28 ILM 1382.

[27] International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (opened for signature 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195.

[28] Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Sweden (23 September 2008) UN Doc CERD/C/SWE/CO/18, paras. 18-19.

[29] The CERD also encouraged Sweden to consider other means of settling land disputes, such as mediation; UN Doc CERD/C/SWE/CO/18, para. 20.

[30] Lawyer Jan Södergren, Stockholm, who has specialized in EU law and the ECHR.

[31] Draft report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Sweden, Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Eighth Session, Geneva, 3-14 May 2010, submitted 14 May 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/8/L.10, hereinafter: Draft report, available at <http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session8/SE/A_HRC_WG.6_8_L.10_Sweden.pdf>.

Joan Donoghue to replace Judge Buergenthal at the ICJ

Our friends over at Opinio Juris report that Joan Donoghue, Principle Deputy Legal Advisor of the State Department, has been nominated by the US national group of the PCA to replace Judge Buergenthal on the ICJ. If this report is true, and Opinio Juris refers to “reliable sources”, the nomination would be somewhat of a surprise. To most active in international legal scholarship, Joan Donoghue is rather unknown. After a quick search in various online catalogues of law libraries I came up with the following articles authored by Joan Donoghue:

  • “Perpetual Immunity for Former Diplomats?: A Response to “The Abisinito Affair: A Restrictive Theory of Diplomatic Immunity?”” (Columbia journal of transnational law, vol. 27, pages 615-630)
  • “The Public Face of Private International Law: Prospects for a Convention of Foreign State Immunity (57 Law and Contemp. Probs. 205)
  • EC participation in protection of the marine environment: Legal and institutional aspects” (Marine Policy Volume 17, Issue 6, November 1993, Pages 515-518)
  • “Taking the “Sovereign” Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception (17 YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 495 (1992))
  • “On learning not to think like a lawyer: Improving the effectiveness of International environmental law” (unpublished manuscript, 1993)

Besides Joan Donoghue’s apparent specialization in the law of diplomatic relations one could also discern a slight affinity to international environmental law. In 1992 she presented a paper entitled “Legal Dimensions of Compliance and Dispute Resolution in a Global Climate Regime” at the annual conference of the International Studies Association and one year later she was part of the US delegation to the International Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change. Joan Donoghue also acted as attorney-advisor on the side of the US in the Nicaragua case before the ICJ. Last year she was part of the panel of the plenary discussion at the annual meeting of the ASIL, on the topic “The Obama Administration’s Take on International Law”.

New Bottle, Old Wine: Israel Forms an Investigation Committee on the Gaza Flotilla Attacks

On 13th June 2010, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office published its draft resolution on “The Appointment of an Independent Public Commission, Headed by Former Supreme Court Justice, Jacob Turkel, to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010″ (available here). This is Israel’s response to the calls by the international community, including the UN and individual states, to launch an “international independent” investigation of the Gaza flotilla attacks (see our previous post on the Flotilla attacks, here). Instead of cooperating with an international investigation, Israel responds by initiating its own.

There is no need to elaborate on the character of Israel’s faulted record of (self) investigations. The most recent example of the nature of Israel’s domestic inquiries was following “Operation Cast Lead” in the Gaza Strip December 2008 – January 2009, when Israel rejected the findings of the Goldstone report and fiercely argued that its domestic investigation was adequate, despite widely consenting claims to the contrary. Virtually none of Israel’s domestic investigations were complaisant with the basic international law standards applicable – namely, independence, impartiality and effectiveness, inter alia. Israel’s investigations have further failed to ensure the participation of the victims and the conclusions of these investigations have consistently claimed that the Israeli military acted in compliance with international law, effectively whitewashing even the most substantiated prima facie allegations of war crimes and violations of IHL presented in countless thoroughly detailed reports by different independent expert groups, including primarily the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (also known as the Goldstone report). For previous posts on Israel’s investigations see, here.

In light of the particular circumstances on the Gaza flotilla attacks, the limited mandate and restricted scope of the investigation launched by Israel makes the conclusions of such an investigation, ab initio, largely immaterial and inappropriate to the assessment of the legality of Israel’s actions against the ships. In order for an investigation to competently assess the legality of Israel’s actions, it needs to examine the intentions of the flotilla mission by investigating the states, organizations and individuals involved. The fact that these actors originate from a number of different states requires necessarily the cooperation of the states concerned in such an investigation.

In the establishment of this investigative body, Israel is clearly looking to fulfill the two main demands expressed by the international community as part of its reactions to the attacks and to Israel’s steps to initiate a national investigation: (i) that the investigation be “prompt, credible, impartial and transparent”; and (ii) that the investigation include an element of “international involvement” or “role”. The appointment of former ICJ Justice Shabbtai Rosen is a clear attempt to fulfill the latter element. Still, the head of the investigatory body, Jacob Turkel, is a former Israeli justice of the Supreme Court and a former judge in the Israeli military courts in the occupied Palestinian territories. The “international” members, including Rosen, hold particularly pro-Israel agendas, which contribute to very serious doubts against their credibility and impartiality. These alongside with other indicators, including statements by politicians and military officials, that give rise to serious doubts that a genuine investigation, which is not designed to shield those responsible from justice, is sought to be conducted.

Similar flaws to those that were applicable to Israel’s previous (self) investigations are already beginning to show. For instance, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been insisting that the Israeli military soldiers would not be questioned, meaning that the investigation procedure will use military debriefings and the findings of the committee appointed by IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi as the basis for its conclusions and recommendations (see article in  Ynet, an Israeli newspaper). Operational military briefings have institutional and structural deficiencies – they are conducted by the military itself and are designed to assess military performance as opposed to identifying criminal behavior or liability. This same kind of evidence was the basis for the finding of the Israeli government’s investigation of “Operation Cast Lead”, which was called inappropriate and whose findings were not recognized by any consequential international body, namely because it is a fundamental breach of the principles of international law concerning the conduct of investigations.

The Israeli government has accepted in the days following the events, the erroneous character of its actions on board of the flotilla ships on 31st May 2010.  It nevertheless proceeds to mount its usual response in the frenzy of defensive rhetoric by establishing an investigation team, which will help ground the Israeli position and possibly also earn Israel legitimacy amongst the circles that may have been hurt by the recent events. As Israel goes through its moves to pacify the international community, the international latter is liable to closely follow this process whilst recalling that the investigations initiated by the Israeli government on the Gaza operations, inter alia, paid no more than lip service to the primal importance of accountability for violations of the basic considerations of humanity upon which the international community stands and which the international governance structures of the UN have been established to uphold and actively secure together with the member states of the UN (i.e. through the concept of erga omnes obligations).

The attacks on the Gaza flotilla are just another example of Israel’s utter disregard for international law, and the demands of the international community of states and UN bodies. This status quo is, however, coupled by Israel’s flagrant disregard for international opinion and therefore its growing engagement with the necessary actors through newly established special bodies to give a pretense of compliance to those who may have questioned Israel’s intentions towards international law. It is thereby that Israel mounts a legitimization campaign through the international legal discourse, making international law itself into a site of conflict.

It also reflects on Israel’s more recent policies towards humanitarian aid workers and missions as well as the numerous battles the Israeli government has been mounting over the past few years against international human rights workers and activists in the occupied Palestinian territory as well as more recently, although not unprecedentedly, against Israeli activists, mostly Palestinians with Israeli nationality, by means of pushing through a series of legislation. These measures amount to systematic violations of international human rights law, specifically the body of rules for the protection of the work and status of human rights defenders. Notably, the most recent legislation premised on the concept of loyalty and citizenship (presented by Foreign Minister Lieberman and his political party “Yisrael Beitenu”, an ultra-right wing group) is part of this campaign, which stands a strong possibility of being formalized in a law. This law would criminalize directors as well as employees of human rights organizations and groups for their work (for more information on this see, here).

In light of the precedent, which unequivocally attests to Israel’s general reluctance to uphold international law in a way that serves truth and justice, it is essential that the international community take immediate action to uphold victims’ rights to the equal protection of the law and an effective judicial remedy and ensure that the perpetrators are no longer operating in a culture of impunity (see also PCHR’s statement on this, here).

——–

For a very insightful piece by Keenan and Weizman on Open Democracy and Maan news on the ‘demonization’ of the NGO community in the context of the flotilla incident, here.

The ICRC has also recently published a statement calling for the immediate lift of the illegal closure of Gaza, which constitutes a form of collective punishment.

It’s official: Judge Thomas Buergenthal will resign from the ICJ

We have heard it before but today the ICJ confirmed that Judge Buergenthal will resign from the ICJ. Judge Buergenthal has been a member of the ICJ since March 2000 and was re-elected to serve a nine-year term beginning in February 2006. He was at the time of his election the first judge of US nationality on the ICJ since 1981. According to a press release from the George Washington University Law School, Judge Buergenthal will return to GW Law to resume his tenure as Lobingier Professor of Comparative Law and Jurisprudence. For his GW Law profile see here.

The date for the election for the vacancy on the ICJ was, pursuant to Art. 14 of the Statute of the ICJ, set by the UN Security Council. In its resolution 1926(2010) the UNSC determined that the election will take place on 9 September 2010 at simultaneous but separate meetings of the UNSC and of the UNGA. The vacancy that was created with Judge Buergenthal’s resignation will be filled for the remainder of his term of office, i.e. until 2015 (cf. Art. 14 ICJ Statute).

Here is the press release from the ICJ:

THE HAGUE, 10 June 2010. Judge Thomas Buergenthal will resign as Member of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with effect from 6 September 2010. His term would have expired on 5 February 2015.

The United Nations has fixed 9 September 2010 as the date for the election of his successor by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Member of the Court then elected will complete Judge Buergenthal’s term.

Judge Buergenthal has been a Member of the Court since 2 March 2000. After his first term, he was re-elected as from 6 February 2006.

Former Judge and President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Administrative Tribunal of the Inter-American Development Bank, Judge Buergenthal is also a Member of the American Bar Association, the American Society of International Law, the American Law Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations and the German Society of International Law. In addition, he is an associé of the Institut de droit international. Holder of numerous prizes and distinctions, Judge Buergenthal sits on the Editorial Board of various publications. He is the author of many books, essays and articles.

Just a couple of days ago Judge Jiuyong from China also resigned from the ICJ; his term was set to expire on 5 February 2012. Elections to fill the vacancy created by his resignation have been set in UNSC resolution 1914(2010) to take place on 29 June 2010 at a meeting of the Security Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session. Judge Jiuyong in 2003 became the first Chinese President of the ICJ.

I won’t start making any predictions on who may become Judge Buergenthal’s or Jugde Jiuyong’s successor. But feel free to share your suggestions in the comment section below ;)

Here is a short overview of the election process:

According to Art. 14 ICJ Statute vacancies shall be filled by the same method as that laid down for the first election. The resignation is to be addressed to the President of the Court (currently Judge Hisashi Owada) who then transmits it to the UN Secretary-General (Art. 13(4) ICJ Statute). With the notification to the UNSG the place at the ICJ is made vacant. Pursuant to Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 5 ICJ Statute, the UNSG then issues invitations to the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration which are also parties to the ICJ Statute (Art. 4(1) ICJ Statute), and to the members of the ad hoc national groups appointed by States not members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Art. 4(2) ICJ Statute), inviting them to undertake the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court. Every group may nominate a maximum of four persons, and only two of whom may be their own nationals (Art. 5(2) ICJ Statute). The date of the election shall, according to Art. 14 in fine ICJ Statute, be fixed by the Security Council.

When making their nominations the national groups are recommended to consult their highest court of justice, their legal faculties and schools of law, and their national academies and national sections of international academies devoted to the study of law (Art. 6 ICJ Statute). The Statute establishes a number of criteria which the (future) judges of the ICJ should fulfil. These include: independence and high moral character. Furthermore the nominees must possess qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or they must be jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law (Art. 2 ICJ Statute). However, although the two electing bodies, the UNSC and the UNGA are called upon to “bear in mind” these individual qualifications (see Art. 9 ICJ Statute), and even if they “should” assure that on the court as a whole the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world are represented, the election procedure is (and has always been) a very politicised matter characterized by confidentiality. The necessary majority is a an absolute majority of votes in the UNGA and in the UNSC (Art. 10(1) ICJ Statute). What is worth noticing is that the vote in the UNSC is taken without distinction between permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC.

Finally, the normal tenure for ICJ judges is nine years (Art. 13(1) ICJ Statute) and they may be re-elected. However, in the current situation where a judge is elected to replace a member whose term of office has not expired, the new judge shall hold office for the remainder of his predecessor’s term. After the expiration of this term he may nevertheless be re-elected for a full term.

South Africa and its World Cup: What about Housing Rights?

South Africa has good reasons to be excited. Tomorrow, 11 June 2010, the 19th FIFA World Cup kicks off in South Africa, this year’s host country of the premier international football tournament. It is the first football World Cup on the African continent. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will attend the opening ceremony in Johannesburg at the personal invitation of Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s President.

According to a United Nations envoy, the World Cup “presents the country and the rest of the continent with an opportunity to harness the power of the international event to project Africa’s potential for peace and development”. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace said that “the World Cup in South Africa is a unique occasion to transform the African people’s pride and enthusiasm into a positive dynamic of solidarity, tolerance, and development. Mega-sports events create legacies such as infrastructure and tourism. This World Cup when successful will also contribute to the confidence and pride of many persons and States in Africa. This is extremely important for the African future”. Summarized, the event “underlines African renaissance”.[1]

But it’s not all roses there. The ‘beautification’ of host cities during preparations for mega-events like the World Cup or the Olympic Games means that thousands of (mainly poor) residents are forced out of their homes. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing said that 20,000 people were removed from the Joe Slovo settlement in Cape Town and moved to poor areas, this to make way for rental housing for the World Cup.[2] The forced eviction of people in the context of mega-sport events is not an exceptional phenomenon. In Britain, 400 people have already been forced to move for the 2012 Olympic Park in London, and in New Delhi, 35,000 families have been evicted in the context of the Commonwealth Games in October 2010. Past events in Barcelona (2002), Atlanta (1996), Seoul (1988) and many more cities have all resulted in the forcible removal of people.[3] In many cases, it is unlikely that those people are allowed to return to their homes after the event.

From an international human rights perspective, the situation of forced evictions as a result of the ‘beautification’ of cities negatively affects several human rights, such as the freedom of movement (including the right not to be arbitrarily displaced), the right to property, the right to respect for private life and the right to adequate housing. I will here zoom in on the right to housing. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, talking about the 2010 World Cup, “all the commitments for affordable housing were left behind and were not prioritized” as a result of the stadium projects falling behind schedule.[4] “The tearing down of informal housing has taken place without prior notice, provision of adequate alternative housing or compensation and in violation of domestic law prohibiting forced evictions. In May 2010 hawkers protested outside the local FIFA operations centre in Soweto calling for an end to evictions and the disruption of their means of livelihood near soccer stadiums”.[5] While South Africa has the primary responsibility to secure the rights of its citizens, also FIFA, the world football’s governing body, has a role to play. But it seems that also FIFA does little to effectively address housing concerns.[6]

The South African constitution states that “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing” (section 26(1)) and that “no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions” (section 26(3)). However, it appears that the South African government considers that the ‘beautification’ of cities with an eye to the World Cup justifies the human rights violations of its citizens. On the international level, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) stipulates in its article 11(1) that every person has the right to adequate housing. The relation between the right to adequate housing and forced evictions has been clarified in detail by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on the one hand in its General Comment No. 4 (see article 8(a) and article 18) and on the other hand in its General Comment No. 7. It is clearly stated that the removal of people against their will from the homes they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection, constitutes a violation of the right to housing. However, while South Africa is a signatory to the ICESCR, it has not (yet) ratified the Covenant and therefore is not legally bound by it. According to Dr. Lilian Chenwi from the Cummunity Law Centre (CLC), “the repeated lack of a public explanation by the Government as to its failure to ratify the ICESCR is wholly unacceptable, especially considering that South Africa has been active in the drafting process of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. We urge the Government to show that it is serious about economic, social and cultural rights in South Africa and internationally, by immediately ratifying the ICESCR”.[7]

It is beyond doubt that the 2010 World Cup will be indelibly printed in the memory of South Africa’s forcibly evicted residents – but it won’t be a nice memory.


[1] http://allafrica.com/stories/201005261343.html

[2] http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/03/08-5

[3] http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/03/08-5

[4] http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/03/08-5

[5] http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/human-rights-concerns-south-africa-during-world-cup-2010-06-04

[6] http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/03/08-5

[7] http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/RWP%20-%20ESR_Reviewn_Vol_9(2)_June_2008.pdf, p 26.

UNHCR expelled from Libya

The following post supplements a previous ILO post by myself (May, 4) on Italy’s “push-back” policy, titled Italy’s asylum policy violates international law (click here). For more information, see also a column published in Human Rights Brief, (2010) Vol. 17(3), titled The European Court of Human Rights scrutinizes Italy’s asylum policy (click here).

Last week, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) operating in Libya received an order from Libyan authorities to cease its work and leave the country.

The UN refugee agency is working in Libya since 1991 and, since Libya itself has no asylum procedure or institutions, is responsible for thousands of refugees in the country. The agency screens asylum seekers arriving in Libya and determines whether they qualify for refugee status according to the UNHCR Statute. About 9,000 refugees have been registered and about 3,700 asylum seekers are waiting for an asylum procedure. Many of those people are Africans in search of a better life, trying to reach European shores by boat, with Libya only as a transit country. A large number of those boat refugees are intercepted by EU member state Italy (as well as member states Greece and Spain) and sent back to countries like Libya, with few human rights guarantees.

The UNHCR strongly regrets the decision to ‘expel’ the agency, especially because no reason was given by the authorities for why the agency can no longer carry out its activities. However, the Foreign Ministry stated that UNHCR’s operations in Libya are illegal. Libyan authorities in Geneva, where UNHCR is headquartered, gave no comments on the situation. Melissa Fleming, spokeswoman of the UNHCR, said the agency is currently negotiating with Libya. It is hoped that the expulsion is only temporary.

Libya is no party to the international refugee convention of 1951 (see here), which prohibits states in its article 33 to return individuals to countries where they risk being persecuted on grounds such as race or religion. Nevertheless, the prohibition of refoulement to countries where the person concerned risks persecution or torture, constitutes international customary law, binding upon all states (see here). Therefore, while Libya itself has no asylum system for the examination of asylum seekers’ situations, refusing to allow UNHCR to carry out its activities in Libya would amount to a violation of international human rights law.